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Abbreviations and Glossary 
 
ADMAC  Agricultural Development in Mine Affected Areas of Cambodia, a  
   CIDA project 
AusAID  Australian Agency for International Development 
AVI   Australian Volunteers International 
CMAA  Cambodia Mine Action Authority also known as the Cambodia  
   Mine Action and Victims Assistance Authority, the national  
   coordinating body 
CMAC  Cambodia Mine Action Centre, Cambodia’s national mine   
   clearance organization 
CMVIS  Cambodia Mine Victims Information Systems 
DfID   Department for International Development 
DWG    District Working Group 
GIS   Geographic Information System 
GSI    Geospatial International 
HALO Trust  One of two prominent foreign mine clearance operators in   
   Cambodia 
HIB    Handicap International Belgium 
LIS    Landmine Impact Survey, conducted in 2000, also known as the  
   Level One Survey 
LUMU  Land Use Management Unit, predecessor to the MAPU in   
   Battambang 
LUPU   Land Use Planning Unit, predecessor to the MAPU 
MAG   Mines Advisory Group, one of two prominent foreign mine  
   clearance operators in Cambodia 
MAPU Process Three tiers of government bodies made up of DWG, MAPU and  
   PMAC that constitute the provincial mine action planning   
   mechanism 
MAPU   Mine Action Planning Unit – Provincial government mine action  
   planning body  
MCA   Multi-criteria analysis 
NSDP   Cambodia’s National Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010 
PMAC   Provincial Mine Action Committee, provincial government  
   oversight body for mine action planning 
PSC    Provincial Sub-Committee, predecessor to the PMAC 
RGC    Royal Government of Cambodia 
TAP Project  Task Assessment and Planning Project 
UNDP   United Nations Development Agency
 1. Executive Summary 
 
1.1. The Task Assessment and Planning (TAP) Project has come at a critical juncture for 
mine action in Cambodia. It is a time when a few donors, Canada among them, argue 
strongly that mine action is best served by building capacity among provincial 
government groups for setting mine action priorities. Few donors would take exception to 
this in principle, but in practice the more influential ones continue to provide support to 
clearance operators – HALO Trust and MAG – whose policies are less committed to 
building government capacity. The TAP project was expected to make the case for the 
perspective Canada endorses: that with coaching, skills and equipment, provincial mine 
action planning bodies can make informed decisions in the best interest of all.  
 
1.2. The most important of these provincial mine clearance planning bodies are the Mine 
Action Planning Units (MAPUs), each one a group of six to eight provincial government 
employees working under the authority of an oversight provincial body, the Provincial 
Mine Action Committee (PMAC). The objective of these two bodies is to produce an 
annual work plan listing the minefields that need to be cleared in an order of importance 
that everyone can agree on. The Royal Cambodian Government strongly supports these 
provincial level planning bodies. Cambodia’s Council of Ministers formally approved a 
‘Sub-Decree’ a formal government decision to make this mechanism a formal part of 
provincial governing structure. Previously the MAPUs, the PMACs and the lower level 
bodies which support them operated under the authority of international NGOs. The first 
year of the Task Assessment and Planning (TAP) project – 2005 - was the first year that 
these provincial mine action planning bodies have received full government endorsement.  
 
1.3. The TAP project aimed to provide facilities (maps and GPS instruments), database 
expertise and training in minefield investigation to members of the MAPUs and some 
training to the provincial department heads serving on the PMACs. Central to the Task 
Assessment and Planning approach was the introduction of an analytical procedure for 
making decisions, a way of arriving at priorities that would rationalize the choices and 
imbue them with authority. Because this analytical tool involved applying a number of 
criteria – such as, for example, risk reduction, economic return, unambiguous 
beneficiaries and others – the tool has been referred to as a multi-criteria analysis (MCA).   
 
1.4. Beginning in August 2004, the TAP project introduced these facilities and techniques 
to the MAPU members and, to some extent, to the PMAC participants. This set in motion 
a first year’s planning cycle, and a year later in September 2005, the provincial MAPUs 
in five provinces produced their own list of minefields to clear in order of priority for 
approval by the PMACs.   
 
1.5. Unexpectedly, another project funded by AusAID was scheduled to build MAPU 
capacity in the same five provinces over the same period of time. It was an awkward 
situation. The AusAID project funded Australian Volunteers International (AVI) to place 
four experienced specialists in Geographic Information Systems among the MAPUs. The 
presence of these four advisors might have been an asset for the TAP project, 
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and efforts were made at the beginning to make it so, but their collaboration has not been 
an easy one. Some project initiatives overlapped, others conflicted and the differences 
between them produced some difficult moments.   
 
1.6. Among the more contentious issues between the two projects has been the centre-
piece of the TAP project, the introduction of the MCA priority setting tool. The AVI 
advisors felt it was too complex and were concerned that the TAP project was 
introducing it in an unresponsive and inflexible manner. The TAP project quarreled with 
the AVI advisors for not giving their unqualified support. As it turned out, the priority 
setting tool did not receive wide acceptance, two provincial MAPUs declined to use it 
altogether, and this aspect of the project has fallen short of expectations.  
 
1.7. Clearance operators were specifically mentioned in the Project Performance Planning 
Framework as stakeholders whom the project would actively engage in supporting the 
project, specifically in establishing the MCA priority setting tool. One might have 
expected the TAP project to make a greater effort to forge direct linkages with the 
clearance operators, with the objective ultimately of gaining broader acceptance from 
them and their partner NGOs in supporting the MAPU Process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.8. The TAP project has delivered many of the inputs it promised, not all. But the way 
the project has been implemented has raised concerns. There are indications that the TAP 
project has not constructively engaged with key project stakeholders including not only 
the AVI partners, but also the CMAA national mine action coordinating body. 
 
1.9. Section Five outlines how the various project inputs and issues have been assessed, 
what indicators were used and how. Section Six reviews the results of measuring project 
performance according to eight key indicators. On some of these indicators, the project 
performs well, on others less well and on some, poorly. The project was ranked with 
respect to each of these performance indicators by assigning a numbered ranking from 1 
(lowest ranking) to 3 (highest ranking) and summing them. The project received a total of 
15 points out of what would have been a perfect score of 24. This is 62 per cent of what 
The MAPU Process 
The MAPU Process refers to collaboration among a complex of provincial government bodies 
which have emerged in recent years to decide on the minefields that merit the most urgent 
attention. These provincial bodies have evolved with each passing year as refinements are made 
to what they are expected to do, to their resources and to their ever-increasing capacity. Though 
the core of this decision-making mechanism in the provinces is now the Mine Action Planning 
Unit (MAPU), the MAPU is only one of three provincial bodies which interact in supporting 
mine action planning and which the TAP project, and other projects preceding it, have aimed to 
strengthen. The other two are the Provincial Mine Action Committee (PMAC) and the District 
Working Group (DWG).  The mechanism was officially recognized in the October 2004 Sub-
Decree on Socio-Economic Management of Mine Clearance Operations approved by the 
Council of Ministers which describes the responsibilities and interactions among these 
provincial government bodies. The background of the MAPU Process and its relevance to the 
TAP project is described in Annex II.  
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would have been an ideal score, less than what one might have expected. Three matters 
are principally responsible.  
 
1.9.1. The use of a directive, rather than a consultative approach for introducing the MCA 
priority setting tool resulted in a number of intended users rejecting or losing interest in 
making it a part of their standard procedures. 
 
1.9.2. The omission of any formal initiative to build bridges between the MAPU groups 
and the clearance operators as well as other NGOs meant that opportunities were missed 
for giving the MAPUs a greater role in managing and maintaining information and 
consequently for affording them greater authority in coordinating minefield clearance. 
 
1.9.3. A collaborative relationship never emerged between the TAP project and the AVI 
project though they were implemented concurrently. The TAP project would have 
benefited by doing more to find ways for the two projects to make the most of their 
comparative advantages. 
 
1.10. The TAP project has had some successes. Its training programs have been 
appreciated. MAPU members cite particularly the training by the TAP project field 
manager, who has extensive minefield experience, on how to survey a minefield and 
how, in particular to take safety precautions. This has made the MAPU members more 
inclined to conduct minefield investigations in person and to visit villages for confirming 
the claims made by the village chiefs in the initial investigations held at district offices. 
MAPU members are now visiting villages and minefields more than before. Inquiry 
protocols, information technology and GPS devices have been provided, giving their 
observations greater precision. Particularly commendable have been efforts of the TAP 
project to bring PMAC members on board by providing training to them, whether it be in 
minefield investigation or the use of the MCA priority setting tool.   
 
1.11. But the shortcomings, especially regarding the way the project has been designed 
and implemented, are as prominent as the successes. An assessment of the TAP project 
offers a valuable opportunity for drawing lessons from this project’s experience for 
improving performance in subsequent endeavors. Lessons learned are reviewed in 
Section 7.  
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2. Context of the TAP Project in Cambodia 
 
2.1. A prepossessing concern of the mine action debate in Cambodia is whether to build 
capacity among government groups to make mine action decisions, or whether to get 
right to the task of clearing as many mines as possible without worrying about whether 
government bodies can do it or not. The country manager of HALO Trust, an influential 
operator, makes his case for clearing as many mines as possible rather bluntly: “We do 
mine action, not good governance,”1 and he has a number of supporters among the more 
powerful donors including the US, Japan, Finland and the Netherlands. Others, Canada 
included, take the different view that building government capacity at the provincial level 
is a better investment, particularly building the capacity of the Mine Action Planning 
Units (MAPUs) and the higher level Provincial Mine Action Committees (PMACs).  
 
2.2. There is another, related dimension to the debate. There are those who prefer to clear 
where there are the most mines and it matters little where they are located, again the 
position of HALO Trust and its supporters. They are skeptical of making clearance serve 
development ends since this puts off solving the real problem; it commits the error of 
“applying a long term solution to a short term problem”.2 Others, like Canada’s 
development officers, argue alternatively that it is better to clear areas which would 
otherwise be productive, such as agricultural land or roads or water sources and that 
contamination, while important, is a secondary consideration. The primary consideration 
is solving poverty where people live and work and it makes little sense to go after the 
mines in heavily contaminated areas where the population is sparse or the economic 
return would be modest. 
 
2.3. In the last few years, as the capacity of Cambodia’s provincial government bodies to 
solve the landmine problem has become stronger, they have made their views known on 
the question of whether to get rid of landmines and reduce accidents or to reduce poverty 
by clearing productive land. There is little doubt about the priority they place on making 
mine action serve economic development by clearing productive land. In all five of 
heavily contaminated provinces where the MAPUs function, they carefully weighed the 
value of choosing areas where risk to people was reduced or where land would be freed 
for economic potential, and in most cases gave priority to areas where there was 
economic or development potential. Their annual plans have not taken the matter lightly. 
Whether formally or informally, the criterion “agricultural potential” is weighted more 
than risk reduction.   
 
2.4. Integrating mine clearance with good governance programs goes hand in hand with 
integrating mine action within a development perspective. Local planning bodies, when 
given the tools to work on their own and when obliged to make the choice, prefer 
                                                 
1
 Interview with Richard Boulter, Country Manager for HALO Trust in Cambodia, 14 February 2006 
2
 An important assumption in HALO Trust’s claim is that the majority of land which is only lightly 
contaminated will be cleared by farmers on their own, though it is difficult for HALO to show just how 
much and where they are likely to do so. Their claim that the mine problem can be solved in a few years is 
disingenuous but it has been claimed so frequently and so vociferously, that it now has the ring of truth. 
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agricultural productivity over accident reduction. While acknowledging in principle the 
preference of government bodies to clear areas with economic potential, the foreign 
clearance operators tend to be guided in practice by other criteria and commitments.  
 
2.5. For the moment, the larger donors support the decisions of foreign operators more 
than those of local planning bodies. Together, the activities of the two largest clearance 
operators – HALO Trust and MAG – consume between 50 and 60 per cent of all mine 
clearance resources available for Cambodia. Not more than 20 per cent of the clearance 
tasks that HALO Trust chooses in a year are likely to appear on the Mine Action 
Planning Unit annual plans. The same is true for MAG though for somewhat different 
reasons.3 Cambodia’s national clearance operator, the Cambodia Mine Action Centre 
(CMAC), works differently since it explicitly supports MAPU decisions by clearing 
where MAPUs have given priority. Overall however, as long as donors support the 
separate agendas of the foreign clearance operators, the national clearance priorities and 
the MAPUs that set them will not have the prominence they deserve.  
 
2.6. A recent proposal by the UNDP to establish and manage a trust fund4 for supporting 
national level and provincial mine action planning bodies might have led foreign 
operators to give greater support to national clearance priorities had it received more 
support. The idea of UNDP’s new trust fund is that operators – HALO, MAG, CMAC 
and others who are accredited – are to be encouraged to bid on clearance projects 
financed out of this fund of donor contributions. Opening mine clearance to competitive 
bidding reduces the cost of landmine clearance by motivating operators to increase their 
efficiency, but it also aims to support national clearance priorities by largely restricting 
clearance tasks to those on the priority list of the provincial MAPUs. Canada is 
considering committing $US 7.1 million over five years, Australia has committed a 
slightly larger amount, Norwegian People’s Aid and the NGO Adopt-a-Minefield have 
also expressed interest. But this is not enough to bring the foreign operators HALO Trust 
and MAG around. Both have opposed the trust fund idea and have given notice that they 
will not participate in competitive bidding. The larger donors such as Japan, the US, 
DfID and the European Union have, up to now, declined to contribute to the trust fund.   
  
2.7. The foreign operators, meanwhile, continue to be openly critical of the MAPU 
priorities. They readily cite cases where a Mine Action Planning Unit (MAPU) task has 
taken them into an area where there were no mines. Or they claim that many of the tasks 
                                                 
3
 MAG espouses integration of mine action with development in theory but in practice it does not often 
follow the annual plan that the Mine Action Planning Units put forward. This is because MAG follows the 
directions that donors such as World Vision and others give them. These donors use MAG to make areas 
safe for their development inputs such as water projects or community development projects and in many 
cases, MAG clears areas principally in order to provide security for development workers, not because the 
areas are of strategic value. The effect is to work at cross purposes from the provincial planning bodies: in 
any given provinces, no more than 20 to 30 per cent of their mine clearance tasks would be the ones that 
the MAPU groups have put on their plan. 
4
 This is the new “Clearance for Results” multi-donor funding facility recently put forward by UNDP, 
described extensively in UNDP and Government of Cambodia, UNDP, Clearing for Results: A Partnership 
for Landmine Action in Cambodia, October 2005; see also Clearing for Results: A Partnership for Mine 
Action in Cambodia, Cambodia Mine Action Authority, December 2005 
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on the MAPU list are areas that have been poorly investigated or areas where they may 
clear a hectare of a minefield and find only one or two landmines that would not have 
gone off anyway. They complain that MAPU investigations are not adequate to the task 
and are likely to lead them to clear in areas that, when completed, will do little to impress 
their donors.   
 
2.8. Canada collaborates with the Royal Government of Cambodia in supporting the 
building of national capacity at the federal and provincial levels. Implicit in this support 
is that preference should be given for clearing in areas where removing landmines 
enhances the economic potential of an area, in other words, for integrating mine action 
with development. As a general rule, mine action should not be an end in itself but a 
means to an explicit developmental end. It is within this perspective that Canada has 
supported the Task Assessment and Planning (TAP) project, which has sought to provide 
the MAPU groups with tools and skills that will enhance the credibility of their choices 
and promote the provincial MAPUs as the central coordinating and tasking mine 
clearance authority in the provinces.  
 
2.9. The TAP project has served a core function in Canada’s evolving strategy for 
Canadian development cooperation with Cambodia. It is one of the last projects to be 
funded through the Canadian Landmine Fund that has, over 5 years, funded more than $8 
million in mine action in Cambodia. Canada is concerned to build on these initiatives. 
This means supporting projects that integrate mine action with development in ways that 
bilateral programs will continue to fund.   
 
2.10. Canada’s Draft Interim Strategy (2005-2007) for Canadian Development 
Cooperation with Cambodia is explicit on this matter. It regards the RGC’s National 
Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) 2006-2010 as Cambodia’s own blueprint and, in its 
Interim Strategy,5 promotes two focus areas designated in the NSDP:  
 
 Strengthening governance 
 Private Sector Development- Rural Entrepreneurship 
 
2.11. Mine action has a significant role in both of these. CIDA’s Cambodia program in 
governance includes support for land reform that will facilitate access to land for the poor 
in rural areas and will support the Ministry of Land Management in re-building the land 
registry and reducing land disputes. The MAPUs play a crucial part in this process by 
ensuring fair distribution of areas where landmines are cleared. It will also include 
continued support for the MAPUs by supporting a program to regulate and direct 
clearance operators’ priorities toward working more closely with the MAPUs and the 
PMACs.  
 
2.12. Canada’s program in private sector development and rural entrepreneurship 
includes support for providing integrated assistance to small farmers with combinations 
of village banking, assistance to farmer organizations and mine action. CIDA’s 
                                                 
5
 CIDA-ACDI, Canadian Development Cooperation with Cambodia, Interim Strategy 2005-2007, 
September 2005 
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Cambodia bilateral program has recently begun the Agricultural Development in Mine 
Affected Areas of Cambodia (ADMAC) project with support to mine action worth $1.1 
million over four years. 
 
2.13. Canada’s approach to mine action – making it part of larger governance or 
agricultural bilateral programs – is an important policy initiative. There is as yet little 
consensus in Cambodia that this kind of an approach is the one that will yield the most 
long term benefit. In fact, there is a body of opinion claiming that these kinds of projects 
detract from the most pressing task, which is to clear as many mines as quickly as 
possible. These are the stakes in making these projects work: not only to prove the point 
in which Canada has invested, but also to show the considerable value of integrating 
mine action into other projects that have as their ultimate objective to produce more food, 
reduce rural household poverty where it is the most severe and strengthen government 
planning capacity in affected provinces.  
 
2.14. There is some indication that Canada’s approach is gaining more international 
support than it previously had. Some major donors may be prepared to invest in programs 
that accord greater authority to local government planning bodies whose inclination has 
been to view mine action in a larger planning perspective, as serving larger economic 
development ends. The TAP project is by no means the only project that showcases this 
somewhat innovative approach, but it is an important one and its performance is a matter 
of some concern. 
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3. The Task Assessment and Planning Project 
 
3.1. The Task Assessment and Planning project commenced on 4 August 2004 with an 
estimated completion date of June 2006. This evaluation has been carried out during the 
18th month of a 22 month project. Very few project activities are envisioned for the 
remaining months apart from regular visits from the project field manager. Total CIDA 
funds budgeted for the TAP project amounts to $720,483 and as of 28 February 2006, 
$648,594 had been disbursed. Ninety percent of the budget has been spent and 82 per 
cent of the project’s expected duration has passed.  
 
3.2. The project has taken place in five sites.  In three of them a related project will 
continue to provide support for the central beneficiary organizations, the Mine Action 
Planning Units (MAPUs). This is the Agricultural Development in Mine-Affected Areas 
of Cambodia (ADMAC) project which is underway. This will allow the support provided 
by the TAP project to segue into another support mechanism although of a different and 
diminished nature.6  In the other two sites, there are no further formal TAP project 
activities. Here, the Mine Action Planning Units (MAPUs) and the planning mechanisms 
which support them continue nevertheless since funding comes from other sources. 
Principal among these sources is the AusAID supported AVI project.7 
 
3.3. No exit strategy has been devised by the TAP project, perhaps because support 
continues in three provinces through a related Canadian support mechanism (the 
ADMAC project) and, in the other two provinces, because support continues from other 
sources. It is nevertheless essential that the project stipulate procedures and polices to 
accompany the termination of the TAP project (see Section 8 Recommendations). 
 
3.4. Geospatial International (GSI), a Canadian firm, has implemented the TAP project. 
Its experience in Cambodia has included, among other things, carrying out the Landmine 
Information Survey (LIS), a nationwide level one survey, five years ago. Geospatial 
International continues its presence in Cambodia in the context of a contribution 
agreement to manage the Agricultural Development in Mine Affected Areas of Cambodia 
(ADMAC).  
 
3.5. The TAP project had a focused objective, and this was to introduce a conceptual tool 
for making credible decisions about which minefields required prior attention in any 
given planning period. This was important because the stakes in these decisions are high 
and they must be seen to be made in an objective and credible manner. The decisions 
must be credible to the villagers who are impatient to have their fields cleared, and they 
also must be credible to the foreign clearance operators who are inclined to make their 
own decisions with little regard to the MAPU Process. The TAP project’s principal input 
was therefore a tool for doing this, an analytical tool that took the MAPU members 
                                                 
6
 Support for the Mine Action Planning Units (MAPUs) in the context of the ADMAC project is still open 
to discussion though it has been part of the project design. 
7
 In addition, funding is expected from the national mine action coordination body (CMAA), from the 
donor supported Seila project or its successor and from NGOs.  
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through establishing criteria, applying the criteria to each of the suspected mined areas, 
ensuring that the proper information was available for applying this tool, weighting the 
criteria in ways the members saw fit and then using the process to decide which of the 
minefields required prior attention. It would ensure that no minefield made the final list 
without ample justification. The TAP project used the phrase, multi-criteria analysis 
(MCA) to refer to this priority setting tool.   
  
3.6. Training was carried out on applying this tool at various stages. Project managers 
trained TAP project staff members, chairmen of MAPUs and the PMAC, and the MAPU 
staff were expected then to train the District Working Group (DWG) members. The TAP 
project employed one person in each province – in two instances, someone from the 
MAPU itself – to work for the TAP project as trainers and team leaders.8 Throughout the 
year, from September 2004 to September 2005, as the annual planning cycle progressed, 
MAPU members were to prepare a work plan for the PMAC to approve using the MCA 
priority setting tool for justifying choices. Other project inputs served the application of 
the MCA priority setting tool, including the following.  
 
3.6.1. Forms and techniques for data collection from communes and village chiefs at the 
district level were introduced. 
 
3.6.2. Village specific, up-to-date maps, generated from satellite imagery for aiding the 
village chiefs in identifying minefields were to be provided by the project to aid in 
confirming information. As it happened, the TAP project decided not to purchase satellite 
imagery and instead attempted to make older aerial photographs usable by increasing 
their resolution. The process took time and these enhanced photos were provided only 
toward the end of the project.   
 
3.6.3. A database scheme was to be designed that would keep the records of MAPU 
investigations, allowing them to track information and decisions made on a province-
wide inventory of suspected mined areas; the original idea was to incorporate a number 
of other data sets, such as poverty data, mine victim and demographic data in the same 
system. As it happened, the TAP project did assemble a database package, but the AVI 
database expert felt it was overly difficult to use and developed his own. The Geospatial 
supported TAP database scheme was never adopted as part of the project.   
 
3.6.4. Training was provided for all those involved in using the maps and forms and 
analytical tools. 
 
3.6.5. Capacity building among the institutions was expected to make the decision- 
making tool and associated practices a part of their standard procedures. 
 
3.7. Official documentation for the TAP project reflects its focus on introducing this 
analytical tool. Three out of the four proposed outputs and outcomes dealt with the 
                                                 
8
 This became a contentious issue between the two projects, TAP and AVI, since AVI disagreed with 
TAP’s taking skillful Mine Action Planning Unit members out of the group when their principal concern 
was to build the MAPU’s capacity.  
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introduction and adoption of the MCA priority setting tool. The Project Performance 
Planning Framework was designed accordingly. It is reproduced in Table 3.1. Five out of 
the seven outcome and output indicators track the adoption of the MCA priority setting 
tool.     
 
3.1. TAP Project Performance Planning Framework 
                                         Performance Indicators 
Outcome Indicators 
1 MAPU staff can manage priority setting process 
2 Stakeholders actively participate in establishing decision support tool criteria 
Output Indicators 
3 MAPU stakeholders are able to participate in MCA in a transparent manner 
4 MAPU staff can assemble required data for multi-criteria analysis decision 
support system 
5 Stakeholders agree the new photo maps are useful for priority setting 
6 CMAA database unit is able to provide up to date information to local staff 
7 MAPU, District and Commune Staff are able to operate and manage MCA 
without external technical advisors 
Source: (1) Geospatial International, “Proposed Logical Framework Analysis and Performance Monitoring 
Plan,” Task Assessment and Planning Project – The Introduction of MCA Decision Support at LUPUs in 
Cambodia, Project Design Document, September 2003; (2) Geospatial International, “Project Performance 
Planning Framework,” Contribution Agreement, July 2004 
 
3.8. The TAP project undertook a self-assessment exercise in August 2005 involving the 
Project Director, Project Field Manager and Project Field Coordinator over a two week 
period. This three-person team visited each of the five sites and asked stakeholders to 
rank the level of satisfaction project participants felt with reference to a number of topics. 
The topics were more diverse than the topics proposed in Performance Planning 
Framework ranging from “the appropriateness of uniforms” to “minefield investigations” 
to “use of the database” to “confidence in ability to communicate successfully with the 
PMAC.” The respondents were asked to rank the level of confidence from one to ten on 
each of these issues, first for the period before the project and then for the present. The 
rankings were averaged and pre-project scores were compared to present scores. When 
asked about their satisfaction with their uniforms before the project, their average score 
was a 2 (out of 10) and after the project, their score was 9.4, a change of 7.4. When asked 
about their satisfaction (and confidence) in using the priority setting tool before the 
project, the average score was 4.1 and afterwards the average score increased to 7.3, a 
change 3.8. A summary of the results is in Annex III. 
 
3.9. Satisfaction is greatest for the uniforms. Satisfaction with training on how to conduct 
minefield investigations is ranked 4th out of 15. Satisfaction or confidence in using the 
priority setting tool is ranked 11th out of 15. Capacity to prioritize minefield tasks is 
ranked 13th and confidence in ability to function without outside support is ranked 15th. 
Table 3.2. shows the ranking among the 15 assessed topics for the seven performance 
indicators given in the project’s original performance indicators. Among the fifteen topics 
examined in this self-assessment, these are ranked in the bottom third. 
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3.10. Table 3.2. shows how the original performance concerns fared among the 15 topics 
assessed in the TAP Project Self-Assessment Exercise. 
 
Table 3.2. Ranking of the Original Performance Indicators among the 15 Topics 
Reviewed in the TAP Project Self-Assessment Exercise 
                                         Performance Indicator Ranking out of 15 
assessed topics 
1 MAPU staff can manage priority setting process 11th 
2 Stakeholders actively participate in establishing decision 
support tool criteria 
Not assessed 
3 MAPU stakeholders are able to participate in MCA in a 
transparent manner 
13th 
4 MAPU staff can assemble required data for multi-criteria 
analysis decision support system1 
9th 
5 Stakeholders agree the new photo maps are useful for 
priority setting 
14th 
6 CMAA database unit is able to provide up to date 
information to local staff 
Not assessed 
7 MAPU, District and Commune Staff are able to operate and 
manage MCA without external technical advisors 
15th 
1This is given as “knowledge of interview techniques” in the list of assessment topics. 
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4. Methods and Measures 
 
4.1. Three key issues structure this assessment of the TAP project’s performance in five 
Cambodian provinces: (1) results achievement, (2) sustainability and capacity building, 
and (3) collaboration and coordination.   
 
4.2. The assessment has sought to capture project performance in meeting the goals and 
objectives it set for itself in the most efficient manner possible. Its indicators may 
therefore be expressed somewhat differently from the performance measures given in the 
project’s own Logical Framework Analysis and Project Performance Planning 
Framework. They cover the same issues, only more succinctly. In order to demonstrate 
the pertinence of this evaluation’s indicators, Annex IV traces the linkages between this 
evaluation’s indicators and the TAP project’s planned outcomes and outputs.  
 
4.3. Attribution is an important consideration. The TAP project was one of a number of 
factors that influenced the principal target of the project, i.e. the three-tiered provincial 
mine action planning mechanism. This mechanism has been in existence for some eight 
years (see Annex II). The MAPU Process) and the recipient of support from a diversity of 
sources and organizations. The TAP project inputs are the most recent of these and a 
piece of the larger puzzle of inputs that have come to make the MAPUs work better. 
There are other pieces of equal or greater significance. The AusAID funded, Australian 
Volunteers International Capacity Building for Mine Action project functioned 
simultaneously and kept four technical experts in place in each of the five provinces 
where the TAP project worked on a permanent basis. They advised and coached the 
MAPU members daily, while the TAP project had only an intermittent presence in the 
five project sites. Although indicators are chosen which aim to isolate the performance of 
the TAP project from that of the AusAID project, the effects are difficult to separate.   
 
Results Achievement  
 
4.4.1. Adoption and Use of the MCA decision making tool. The adoption and use of the 
MCA decision making tool for setting priorities captures the TAP project-specific input, 
in particular, how effectively it was conceived and introduced.   
 
Performance indicator I: Adoption of the MCA decision making tool as part of the 
MAPU regular operating procedures assessed on a scale of 1 to 4: 1 = no system of 
priority setting used; 2 = a rudimentary priority setting system used without reference to 
MCA; 3 = a priority setting system used based on MCA but poorly understood; 4 = a 
priority setting system, based on MCA, used and understood. 
 
Performance Indicator II: Percentage of the total clearance tasks assigned high priority.  
The MCA tool is used most efficiently when it successfully discriminates between high, 
medium and low priority tasks, specifically when it is able to reserve high priority 
rankings for a select few, or small percentage of total tasks; it is less useful when it fails 
to discriminate and assigns high priority to a large percentage of tasks.   
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4.4.2. Acceptance of MAPU decisions by clearance operators. The objective of support to 
the provincial mine action planning bodies is for their decisions to guide those of 
clearance operators about where to clear. Only then are the provincial mine action 
planning bodies in a position to coordinate mine clearance tasks and to ensure that the 
tasks selected correspond to provincial and local concerns, not the special agendas of 
donors or of the operators themselves.  
 
Performance indicator III:  MAPU sanctioned clearance tasks expressed as a percentage 
of all annual clearance tasks for each of the operators.  
 
4.4.3. MAPU coverage of affected communes and districts. An important measure of 
MAPU’s reliability is the number of affected villages and communes where inquiries 
have taken place and the coverage that MAPUs have been able to achieve in a province.  
 
Performance indicator IV: Number of districts and communes where MAPU members 
have conducted investigations expressed as a percentage of total affected districts and 
communes in a province.  
 
Sustainability  
 
4.5.1. Technical capacity and skills acquisition. An overall estimation of skill levels was 
elicited by asking the MAPUs in each of the five provinces to assess themselves by 
answering the question: how many years were needed before the MAPU themselves felt 
fully competent to perform all functions without outside technical assistance? 
 
Performance indicator V: Number of years required before MAPU members are able to 
perform all functions without external assistance – view of MAPU members.  
 
4.5.2. Quality of Governance. MAPUs are governed internally by chairmen, or chiefs, 
appointed by the provincial governor. The quality of this leadership is an indication of the 
commitment of the provincial government to provide quality leaders as well as a 
significant factor in the strength of the MAPU as an institution. The TAP project 
conducted training programs for these leaders and was in a position to enhance their 
grasp of, and commitment to the MAPU Process.   
 
Performance indicator VI: Quality of leadership based on observations and polling of 
stakeholders judged by whether the leader has a clear grasp of the MAPU Process 
assessed on a scale of 1 to 4: 1= no grasp of the MAPU Process in general, the sequence 
of operations, the database and the ranking system; 2= little grasp of the MAPU Process, 
the sequence of operations, the database and the ranking system; 3= moderate grasp of 
the MAPU Process with evidence of contributing creatively to the sequence of 
operations, the database and the ranking system; 4 = full grasp of the MAPU Process 
with evidence of contributing creatively to the sequence of operations, the database and 
the ranking system 
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Performance indicator VII: Quality of leadership based on observation, polling of 
stakeholders judged by the respect he holds among the MAPU members assessed on a 
scale of 1 to 4: 1 = no capacity to instill coherence and motivation to the group; 2 = 
moderate capacity to instill coherence and motivation; 3 =demonstrated capacity to instill 
coherence and motivation; 4 = innovative in instilling coherence and motivation. 
 
Collaboration and Coordination 
 
4.6. With a number of other contributors supporting the MAPU Process or involved in its 
evolution, it was essential for the TAP project to work in concert with other stakeholders 
to avoid duplication, to ensure the lessons of the TAP project benefited other programs 
and to marshal the support of a range of actors for the inputs specific to the TAP project.  
 
Performance indicator VIII: Record of collaboration with three bodies or institutions: 
 
 Australian Volunteers International 
 Cambodian Mine Action Authority (the national coordinating body),  
 Provincial Mine Action Committees 
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5. Results, Sustainability and Coordination 
 
Results Achievement 
 
5.1. By the end of the year 2005, all five Mine Action Planning Units (MAPUs) had 
concluded a first year’s planning cycle culminating in a provincial workshop that 
approved their province’s mine clearance plan for 2006. TAP project inputs aimed to 
expedite the planning cycle, improve the quality and give it a greater measure of 
authority. Three indicators serve to render account of what the project has achieved.  
 
Adoption of the MCA priority setting tool 
 
5.1.2. Users of the MCA priority setting tool were expected to identify different criteria, 
or reasons, for why a minefield should be cleared, including typically: (1) reduction of 
risk, (2) whether the cleared land would have an immediate development spin-off such as 
growing crops or clearing school grounds, (3) numbers of beneficiaries, (4) whether a 
clearance operator (HALO Trust, MAG or CMAC) seemed interested in tackling the 
project and (5) whether clear ownership of the cleared land could be demonstrated.9 Then 
they ranked the importance of clearing a minefield for each criterion with 1 being the 
least and 3 being the most important: a minefield might receive a ranking of 1 from the 
perspective of ‘reduction of risk’ and a ranking of 3 from the point of view of having a 
‘development spin-off.’ The rankings for all the criteria used were summed to get an 
overall score for each minefield that could be compared to other minefields under 
consideration.   
 
5.1.3. The original idea was to introduce this scheme at district level meetings when all 
the demining tasks for a district and its constituent communes were reviewed by the 
District Working Group. The majority of the District Working Groups failed to 
understand the activity. 10    
 
5.1.4. Ideally, the MCA priority setting tool was to be used at the provincial level when 
the MAPU presented results of their investigations for consideration by the PMAC who 
met to approve the work plan for the year. Each of the 100 or 200 minefields were to be 
ranked according to agreed-upon criteria and when the scheme included 5 or more 
criteria, it was very time consuming. All of the PMACs tried the scheme initially. Two of 
the provinces, Preah Vihear and Otdor Meancheay subsequently declined to use the 
scheme for various reasons. The Battambang MAPU made an effort to use the scheme 
                                                 
9
 Each of the three provinces that chose to use the TAP project MCA scheme adopted different numbers of 
criteria – 3 in Pailin, 5 in Battambang and 7 in Banteay Meancheay.  
10
 The AVI advisors have recommended against the use of the MCA priority setting tool at the District 
Working Group level: “The matrix scoring approach dominates, distracts and confuses the workshop 
attendees, and the results from this year’s experience are not actually utilized for the final district workplan 
decisions. AusAID – Australian Volunteers International, “Review and Recommendations from MAPU 
Planning Process 2005,” February 2006 
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though the leader of the group had a poor grasp of what was involved. In the remaining 
two provinces, only one weighted the criteria. Table 5.1. reviews the levels of adoption. 
 
Table 5.1. Adoption Levels for the MCA Priority Setting Tool in the First Planning Cycle 
Province Was it 
adopted? 
Level of 
adoption1 
Remarks 
Battambang Yes, but 
application 
not fully 
understood 
3 Each demining task was scored from 1 to 3 on 
seven criteria and the scores summed to 
distinguish between high, medium and low. 
None of the MAPU members were able to 
explain how scores were assigned.  
Pailin Yes 4 Each demining task was scored from 1 to 3 on 
five criteria and the scores summed to 
distinguish between high, medium and low 
priority.   
Banteay 
Maencheay 
Yes 4 For each demining task, potential uses and 
number of beneficiaries were given. In 
addition, scores were assigned for each of 
nine criteria. The criteria were arranged in 
two groups: risk reduction and economic 
benefit and, each were weighted. Subtotals 
were summed for the two categories and used 
with overall totals for distinguishing between 
high, medium and low priorities. A written 
explanation of the scoring system was 
prepared.  
Otdor 
Meancheay 
No 2 Demining task priorities were assigned by 
proposing a year – 2006, 2007 or 2008 – for 
clearance. These years had been assigned by 
village chiefs when initially questioned. The 
training of the PMAC members came too late 
in the planning cycle for them to apply the 
prioritizing scheme. Enthusiasm for the 
scheme was low. 
Preah 
Vihear 
No 1 The area and the number of beneficiaries were 
given for each demining task. The MAPU 
members had decided not to apply the TAP 
project’s MCA priority setting tool.   
Total score for level of 
adoption 
14  
% of maximum score 56%  
11 = no system of priority setting used; 2 = a rudimentary priority setting system used without reference to 
MCA; 3 a priority setting system used based on MCA but poorly understood; 4 = a priority setting system, 
based on MCA, used and understood 
 
5.1.5. After encountering some resistance, various efforts were made to render the 
scheme more user-friendly. Since the TAP project did not have an on-going presence in 
 17
the provinces, it relied on the other (AVI) project’s advisors to keep an interest in the 
MCA priority setting tool alive. The AVI advisors, however, had reservations about the 
priority setting tool and expressed frustration at having to support a scheme which they 
found difficult to convey and which they felt was not entirely appropriate to the 
circumstances.  
 
5.1.6. The MCA priority setting tool has been applied with comprehension in two of the 
five MAPUs. It was applied in a third without full comprehension, in a rudimentary way 
in a fourth, and not all in a fifth. This evaluation’s assessment of adoption levels of the 
priority setting tool gives 56 per cent of the maximum score (Table 5.1.). In contrast, the 
TAP project’s progress report for the quarter ending December 30th 2005 claimed that 
“97% of MAPU staff and PMAC are able to apply the MCA weighting and scoring 
system.”11 
 
5.1.7. The success of the scheme for setting priorities depends not only on its adoption 
but also on how it is used to make difficult discriminations among mine clearance tasks. 
The scheme is of limited utility when a high percentage of tasks is ranked in the high 
priority category. Table 5.2. gives a breakdown of how many tasks fell into each category 
(high, medium, low priority) expressed as a percentage for each of the provinces.  
 
Table 5.2. Number and Per Cent of Mine Clearance Tasks Given High, Medium and Low 
Priority  
Province # High priority 
SMAs 
Medium Priority 
SMAs 
Low priority SMAs Total 
Tasks 
 Number % Number % Number  %  
Battambang 67 62% 31 29% 10 9% 108 
Pailin 40 57% 10 14% 20 29% 70 
Banteay 
Maencheay 
93 72% 26 22% 7 6% 126 
Otdor 
Meancheay1 
47 21% 42 20% 131 59% 220 
Preah Vihear2 - - - -  - - 
1In Otdor Meancheay, MAPU applied a very different ranking scheme, based on whether village leaders 
requested clearance in 2006, 2007 or 2008. 2006, 2007 and 2008 are taken here to mean high, medium and 
low respectively.  
2In Preah Vihear, the group decided not to apply the MCA priority setting tool and not to use rankings.  
 
5.1.8. In the three provinces where the scheme was adopted (Battambang, Pailin and 
Banteay Meahcheay) high priorities were assigned to the majority of the tasks. This 
reflects the temptation for villages to give information that stresses the urgency of 
implementation and for provincial officials to convey this urgency to donors. The MCA 
priority setting tool might have been more credible had it avoided this temptation. In a 
fourth province, Otdor Meancheay, MAPU members ranked mine clearance tasks by 
                                                 
11
 GeoSpatial International Inc, “Task Assessment and Planning Project in Cambodia” Progress Report for 
the Quarter Ended 30 December 2005 
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whether the task should be undertaken in 2006, 2007 or 2008. The proportion of urgent 
tasks in this province – i.e. scheduled for 2006 - is less than in the others.  
 
5.1.9. Many of the MAPUs fill out the matrix in deference to the TAP project, but the 
application has been a struggle and it will probably not become a regular MAPU practice 
in the long term if used in its present form. It is too complex an instrument to be used at 
the District Working Group level; in its original form it is too time consuming for 
provincial level decision makers to adopt; and many MAPU members find it cumbersome 
to apply. A simpler approach has been proposed in a recent review of the MAPU 
planning process by the AVI advisors.12 
 
Acceptance of MAPU Decisions by Clearance Operators   
 
5.2.1. Three operators have a presence in the five northwest provinces: the Cambodian 
Mine Action Centre (CMAC), HALO Trust and MAG. CMAC is a para-statal 
organization that follows MAPU priorities with some exceptions. HALO Trust clears 
mainly where the contamination is worse, where they find the largest number of 
landmines and where accidents are more likely to happen. For the most part, this excludes 
clearing for economic benefit and puts HALO Trust at odds with the MAPU Process. 
MAG clears in response to the wishes of its donors, be it Care or DFID or World Vision, 
who task MAG to clear at project sites to reassure them of their staff’s safety. Since 
MAG must respond to its funding partners, it may agree with MAPU priorities in 
principle but it does not follow them in practice (see footnote 3). 
 
5.2.2. The question is whether the support MAPU members have received through the 
TAP project has made any difference in their credibility with operators, whether the 
operators are more inclined now than before to include MAPU priorities in their work 
plan. Some operators do not work in some of the provinces, and in some of the provinces 
it was not possible to meet with the operators.13 Table 5.3. assembles the data and gives 
the percentage of MAPU priorities among the operator tasks in four provinces for each of 
the three operators.  
 
5.2.3. The CMAC operators support MAPU priorities with the occasional exception of 
tasks that come to them as emergencies or as requests to clear areas where development 
related construction is pending. Clearance for school construction is such a case. HALO 
Trust takes on a few MAPU tasks when these fit their own criteria, and the district of 
Kamrieng in Table 5.3. is a good example. The HALO Trust office in Otdor Meancheay 
is exceptional in the northwest in working more closely with the MAPU office. MAG 
clears first where their donors wish them to clear and the data from the two MAG offices 
given in Table 5.3. is illustrative. For the six cases reported in the table the percentage of 
MAPU priorities among the total number of tasks accepted by operators is less than 50 
per cent.  
 
                                                 
12
 AusAID – Australian Volunteers International, “Review and Recommendations from MAPU Planning 
Process 2005,” February 2006 
13
 No operators were interviewed in Pailin. 
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 Table 5.3. Acceptance of MAPU Priorities by Clearance Operators - 2006 
Province Total operator 
tasks for area 
in question 
Number of 
MAPU tasks 
included  
MAPU tasks as 
per cent of 
operator totals 
Cambodia Mine Action Centre (CMAC) Tasking 
Banteay Meancheay  51 45 88% 
Preah Vihear  65 61 94% 
HALO Trust Tasking 
Battambang (Kamrieng)  50 9 18% 
Otdor Meancheay 16 14 88% 
MAG Tasking 
Battambang  124 24 19% 
Preah Vihear  50  15 30% 
    
Total 356 168 47% 
 
5.2.4. This is low. Efforts to strengthen the MAPU Process have not achieved their 
objective of making the MAPU credible coordinators of mine clearance planning. Some 
changes are taking place nevertheless: MAPU members are now welcome in the offices 
of MAG and HALO Trust and there is closer contact between MAPU members and 
operators in all provinces. Almost all the operators regard the MAPU office as the 
clearing house for clearance operations, and they are generally conscientious about 
notifying MAPU of their intentions to clear even if the task does not figure on MAPU’s 
priority list. 
 
MAPU Coverage of Affected Communes and Districts 
 
5.3. MAPU members collected minefield data initially from village chiefs brought 
together at commune offices to provide information on their home villages, and 
subsequently, by visiting select villages/minefields to confirm information on reported 
minefields. All MAPUs made an effort to have some contact with a large percentage of 
the affected communes. Table 6.4. reviews the number of districts and communes visited 
by the MAPU members and shows this as a percentage of the affected areas.  
 
5.3.1. A number of factors influence coverage. More efficient investigative techniques 
provided by the TAP project have made some difference. The number of members in the 
MAPU group and how well they function is another.  Support from the provincial 
government is a particularly important factor since the PMAC chairman can facilitate 
matters, secure funding for travel or sign travel requests without delay; he can also 
obstruct MAPU activities by not tending to these matters. Size is also a factor. 
Battambang and Preah Vihear are the larger provinces and here coverage is less than 
elsewhere. Note that Table 5.4. shows only the coverage for the first planning cycle 
without any comparison to a baseline or previous year.  
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Table 5.4. Coverage of Affected Districts and Communes 
Province # Affected 
Districts  
# Districts 
Covered 
% 
Coverage 
# Affected 
Communes  
# Communes  
Covered 
% Coverage 
Battambang 13 91 69% 49 16 33% 
Pailin 2 2 100% 8 8 100% 
Banteay 
Meancheay 
5 5 100% 32 32 100% 
Otdor 
Meancheay 
5 4 80% 24 8 33% 
Preah Vihear 4 4 100% 292 38 76% 
1This number varied considerably in the discussion, from 3 to 9. The higher number is used here.  
2Actually the MAPU members covered only 10 of these, but the CMAP-C, a GSI employee working 
separately from the MAPU provided coverage for some more. There was little coordination between the 
CMAP-C and the MAPUs and there was some overlap.  
 
5.3.2. There have undoubtedly been increases in coverage from the previous year, even if 
they are not shown in Table 6.4. and the TAP project can take some of the credit. At the 
same time, the table does show provinces where the percentage of affected areas covered 
remains modest and, not surprisingly, these are the areas where provincial support is less 
and where more effort is required to ensure greater budgetary and political support from 
provincial leaders for MAPU transport and travel allowances. These are areas where a 
more effective capacity building approach, implemented with a greater concern for 
donor, NGO and government coordination would have placed a greater obligation on 
provincial officials to support the MAPU Process.    
 
Sustainability and Capacity Building 
 
5.4. Government bodies like the MAPUs are more likely to endure when they serve their 
purposes expertly and when they are governed well. The TAP project contributed to both 
technical capacity with training and equipment and to good governance through efforts to 
improve the quality of leadership.  
 
Technical capacity and skills acquisition 
 
5.4.1. The MAPUs and their oversight body, the PMACs received a succession of inputs 
in 2005: a scheme for collecting data, training in data collection, minefield safety, 
database management for the information collected, a matrix for setting priorities and 
coaching for putting it in practice, the use of maps and other mine action related skills. 
The acquisition of these resources and skills should have built group confidence and 
increased the groups’ independence from external expertise. The extent to which this 
occurred is reflected in MAPU members’ response when asked how many years would it 
take before they could work entirely on their own. 
 
5.4.1. In most cases, MAPU members felt they had mastered the field work part of the 
job. They had learned to walk in and work in minefields, they had learned the forms and 
they had mastered the entry of data. But there were some areas where they admitted more 
skill was needed. The first was the management of data since many of them were familiar 
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with the MS Access database and GIS but felt uncomfortable with exporting data and 
manipulating it. They were concerned about presenting the data in spreadsheets for 
consideration by the PMACs or the clearance operators. Some mentioned they had not 
fully understood the MCA priority setting tool. And they were particularly concerned 
about their capacity to negotiate their needs and concerns with provincial government 
overseers, the PMACs and the national coordination body, the CMAA. Table 5.5. gives 
specific answers to the question, how long before you are able to perform these activities 
on your own? Confidence is high, especially in two locations, Pailin and Preah Vihear 
where, notably, the MAPU chairmen have been effective and supportive. It is worth 
noting that the number of years needed before MAPU members felt ready to work on 
their own increases where governance has been less effective.  
 
Table 5.5. Number of Years before MAPUs Feel They Can Work on their Own 
 Battambang Pailin Banteay 
Meancheay 
Otdor 
Meancheay 
Preah Vihear 
Years  2 1 2 1.5 1 
   
Governance 
 
5.4.2. MAPUs are governed internally by chairmen appointed by the provincial governor. 
The quality of their governance is an indication of the commitment of the provincial 
government to appoint capable individuals; it is also an indication of the personal 
commitment that the MAPU chairman brings to the job.14 The TAP project conducted 
training programs for these leaders and was in a position to enhance their grasp of, and 
commitment to, the MAPU Process.   
 
5.4.3. Formal and informal discussions with MAPU members, advisors and government 
officials have contributed to assessing leadership according to two indicators: (1) the 
MAPU chairman’s grasp of the MAPU Process and (2) the respect the chairman receives 
from the MAPU members. Results are given in Table 6.6.   
 
5.4.4. In Preah Vihear, a diligent MAPU chairman has held the post from the beginning 
of the project, he is senior and commands respect. In Pailin, an excellent leader has just 
resigned but her legacy remains strong and her successor is strong and well-informed.  In 
Battambang, there is a MAPU chairman who does not fully understand the process or the 
data and, while appreciated, does not command respect within his group. In Banteay 
Meancheay, the MAPU chairman neglects his duties and leaves responsibility to a 
deputy. In Otdor Meancheay, the present MAPU chairman has assumed the 
responsibilities of a capable predecessor who was hired out of the MAPU group by the 
TAP project as its local coordinator and who never returned. Circumstances vary, but 
overall conditions for ensuring greater competence and continuity in MAPU leadership 
need to be improved.     
 
                                                 
14
 The remuneration that MAPU members and their chairmen receive is too little to command a full time 
commitment from most officers who typically hold other jobs while keeping their government post. It 
requires a person with genuine commitment to commit full time.  
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Table 5.6. Quality of Leadership 
Province Grasp of the Process1 Respect of the Group2 Total score 
Battambang 1 2 3 
Pailin 3 2 5 
Banteay 
Maencheay3 
3 1 5 
Otdor 
Meancheay 
2 2 4 
Preah Vihear 3 3 6 
Total 12 10 23 
% of maximum 
score 
80% 67% 76% 
11= Little grasp of the MAPU Process in general, the sequence of operations, the database and the ranking 
system; 2= moderate grasp of the MAPU Process, the sequence of operations, the database and the ranking 
system; 3= full grasp of the MAPU Process with evidence of contributing creatively to the sequence of 
operations, the database and the ranking system. 
21 = moderate capacity to instill coherence and motivation to the group; 2 = demonstrated capacity to instill 
coherence and motivation; 3. innovative in instilling coherence and motivation 
3In Banteay Meancheay, the MAPU Chief rarely participated and in his place, a Deputy Chief had become 
the de facto leader. The low score in the second column accounts for the resentment felt among the group 
of having to make up for an absentee leader and does not reflect on the leadership capacity of the Deputy 
Chief.  
 
Coordination and collaboration 
 
5.5. Although coordination and collaboration do not figure in the project’s objectives or 
anticipated results, they have been essential preconditions for achieving them. The mine 
action sector in Cambodia involves a number of actors and cross cutting networks for 
linking them. Collaboration with them individually, and through the cross-cutting 
networks, is essential for any initiative and especially for the TAP project in this first 
planning cycle year when the AusAID Australian Volunteers International supported a 
similar project with similar objectives in the same locations.   
 
5.5.1. Initially, the two projects – TAP and AVI – resolved to collaborate and together 
they established a Joint Steering Committee to guide their collaboration. The principal 
cross-cutting network, Cambodian National Mine Action NGO Forum (an informal but 
influential working group of mine action actors), expressed its concern early on about the 
two overlapping projects and struck its own internal committee, headed by the country 
director for HALO Trust, to oversee the two projects’ collaboration. As it turned out 
neither the Mine Action Forum coordinating committee nor the Joint Steering 
Committee15 took any significant initiative to promote a collaborative working 
relationship between them or to resolve differences as they arose.  
 
5.5.2. The two projects were left to forge their own relationship. Their collaboration is the 
first and most important of three collaborations discussed below. The second is the TAP 
project’s interaction with the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA), the national 
                                                 
15
 The Joint Steering Committee for the AVI and TAP projects has met three times over 18 months. 
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coordination body which has maintained a close interest and not always an easy 
relationship with the TAP project. The third is the TAP project’s on-going involvement 
with the PMACs, the provincial bodies that oversee the activities of the MAPUs.   
 
The TAP project and Australian Volunteers International (AVI) 
 
5.5.3. AVI had previous experience with mine action planning at the provincial level 
since technical advisors from AVI had been working with the provincial government in 
Battambang since 1999. When the two projects came simultaneously on stream in 
August/September 2004, four new AVI technical advisors arrived to work closely with 
the five target provinces. They were experienced professionals with GIS, engineering and 
land use planning skills and their functions had been agreed following extended 
consultation. By contrast, the TAP project appeared to “drop from the clouds” with less 
consultation.16  
 
5.5.3.1. While there were attempts on the part of the TAP project and the AVI advisors to 
work together, differences arose. The AVI advisors objected to the TAP project engaging 
MAPU staff for TAP project activities in two provinces, essentially removing 
experienced personnel from the MAPU team that the AVI advisors had come to 
strengthen.  
 
5.5.3.2. When the TAP project introduced its MCA priority setting tool, the AVI 
technical advisors suggested the tool, as it was being presented, might be too complex for 
the MAPU members to use effectively. The TAP project reacted strongly to the AVI 
advisors’ expression of concern. It is possible that the AVI advisors expressed their 
concern in ill-chosen circumstances, in the context of a public forum. The TAP Project 
reacted strongly. Its director notes in the Progress Report for March 31st 2005 that 
“collaboration with Australian Volunteers International became very difficult in January 
with representatives of AVI raising differences of approach between AVI and GSI (TAP 
project) in two separate public forums, without prior contact with GSI management.” The 
report notes further that the second meeting, “attended by the Ambassador of Canada, 
was marred by the airing of issues by AVI that had not been previously discussed with 
the TAP project.”17 The differences were raised in a meeting between the Australian and 
Canadian Ambassadors. These differences were subsequently reconciled to some extent, 
but the AVI advisors regretted the matter had escalated to such a level and were 
subsequently judicious in choosing matters for discussion with the TAP Project Director. 
Future collaboration on the MCA priority setting tool was limited. The AVI advisors 
continued to have reservations about the complexity of the MCA priority setting tool 
discreetly urging that the tool be significantly simplified.18 And the TAP Project Director 
                                                 
16
 Interview with Scott Rankin, Senior Manager, Australian Volunteers International. This view was shared 
by a number of informants familiar with the TAP project.  
17
 GeoSpatial International Inc, “Task Assessment and Planning in Cambodia,” Progress Report for the 
Quarter Ended March 31st 2005 
18
 AusAID – Australian Volunteers International, “Review and Recommendations from MAPU Planning 
Process 2005 in the Capacity Building for Mine Action Project” February 2006 
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continued to suspect members of the AVI team of providing “conflicting advice” that 
limited the tool’s acceptance in certain provinces.19  
 
5.5.3.3. Differences arose on two further issues. The first was over what software was 
more appropriate for the long term maintenance of minefield records. The TAP project 
specialist, engaged by the TAP project for a period of nine months, preferred a more 
elaborate software while the AVI advisors advocated something simpler. The TAP 
project database was completed but never used.   
 
5.5.3.4. The second issue emerged following the preparation, by the TAP project, of a 
Technical Operation Guidebook20 summarizing the project’s view of the seven basic 
operations the MAPU Process ought to undertake in a typical planning cycle with 
particular reference to the use of the MCA priority setting tool. The Technical Operation 
Guidebook had been reviewed by each of the provinces. But the AVI advisors were 
concerned that the Guidebook should be incorporated into the CMAA national guidelines 
and approved by the CMAA before being made part of the standard procedures for the 
provinces. The TAP project rejected this suggestion claiming the Guidebook is 
“MAPU/PMAC property for their local operational guidance.”21 
 
The TAP project and the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA) 
 
5.5.4. The Cambodia Mine Action Authority (CMAA) is the national coordinating body. 
It maintains a national database, provides a national forum where issues of national 
importance are discussed and, in principle, oversees the MAPU Process. It might have 
been logical for the TAP project to forge closer links with the CMAA, but it did not. 
Even though the TAP project signed its Memorandum of Understanding22with the 
CMAA, the CMAA was rarely consulted on project matters.   
 
5.5.4.1. The TAP project may have had its reasons for keeping CMAA at arms length and 
for avoiding any relationship that would have involved financial transactions. But 
promises were made and never fulfilled and the consequence has been that the CMAA 
has remained resentful of the TAP project. The CMAA Director has accused the TAP 
project of betraying him and of betraying the government institution which supports and 
coordinates mine action.23 
 
5.5.4.2. It might have mattered little had the TAP project been engaged in an endeavor 
that relied less on government support. However, the TAP project was building a 
                                                 
19
 GeoSpatial International Inc, “Task Assessment and Planning in Cambodia,” Progress Report for the 
Quarter ended December 30th, 2005 
20
 Mine Action Planning Units and the TAP project, Technical Operation Guidebook, draft, December 2005  
21
 GeoSpatial International Inc, “Task Assessment and Planning in Cambodia,” Progress Report for the 
Quarter ended December 30th, 2005 
22
 The Memorandum of Understanding was signed in mid-2004 between GeoSpatial International Inc., in 
partnership with Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) Government of Canada and 
Cambodia Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) Royal Government of Cambodia. 
23
 Interview with HE Sam Sotha, Advisor to the Prime Minister and Secretary General of Cambodian Mine 
Action and Victim Assistance Authority, 20 February 2006 
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government institution with modest resources and relied on the support of government 
institutions. Support was needed in particular to ensure that the political and financial 
resources of the provincial government would be made available when needed. In the 
instances where the provincial governor or deputy governor has declined to provide 
support to the MAPUs or has been slow in doing so, the only recourse is to appeal to a 
higher government authority. CMAA is this authority. 
 
5.5.4.3. As it happened, support within provincial governments for the MAPUs has not 
always been forthcoming. The PMACs are expected to approve work plans and provide 
support for the MAPUs, to review the prioritized lists and approve annual plans as well as 
sanction their travel and activities. This kind of provincial support has ranged from little 
to none at all in four out of the five provinces, Pailin being the exception. Rarely do the 
members of the PMAC come to meetings in Battambang; in Preah Vihear, the head of the 
PMAC is rarely available, in Banteay Meancheay, he can be dismissive of MAPU 
activities and in Otdor Meancheay, the chairman deliberately interferes, using his 
influence to access the MAPU resources for his own use.  
 
5.5.4.4. The TAP project’s attempts to secure greater provincial government support 
might have been easier had it more judiciously nurtured its relationship with the CMAA 
and been able to solicit CMAA’s intervention at critical junctures.     
 
The TAP project and the Provincial Mine Action Committees (PMAC)  
 
5.5.5. The PMAC approves the annual plans submitted to them by MAPUs which serve 
as their investigative unit. Composition of the PMAC includes provincial department 
heads, provincial military commanders and district chiefs and it is usually chaired by the 
governor or deputy governor. For the most part, it is a large and unwieldy body, usually 
too large and with too many separate interests to closely review the extensive technical 
submission provided by the MAPUs in the workshop for preparing the annual plan.24  
The TAP project has recognized the critical, though often reluctant involvement of the 
PMACs and has taken pains to maintain collaborative and supportive relations with them.  
 
5.5.5.1. The budget of the MAPU is a perpetual dilemma. Little can be done about 
salaries since salary levels are set by the regulations which govern the decentralization 
process, but there is also the matter of equipment, transportation and travel (to 
minefields) and office resources. The authority of the PMAC is essential for supporting 
MAPU’s basic requirements.   
 
5.5.5.2. The TAP project has been mindful of the commitments required from PMAC 
members who may, at the same time, have little or no motivation to meet these them. 
From the beginning the TAP project has included PMAC members, and especially the 
PMAC chairmen, in its training exercises. It has provided resources to PMAC members 
and has conducted training on the MCA priority setting tool as well as on mapping and 
                                                 
24
 It is strongly recommended here, and elsewhere, that the MAPU annual plan be reviewed by a small 
working sub-committee of the PMAC before it is submitted to a plenary meeting for official approval (see 
para 8.2.)   
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data management, recognizing, throughout the project, the crucial role that senior 
provincial officers play in maintaining MAPU support.  
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6. Summary Assessment 
 
6.1. Table 6.1. summarizes observations of the previous chapter. The project’s 
performance for each of the indicators proposed in Section 4, Methods and Measures, is 
ranked in a rudimentary fashion, assigning a number between 1 (lowest) and 3 (highest) 
for the project’s performance on each of the indicators.25 This table shows where the 
project has done well, less well and poorly.  
 
Table 6.1. Summary Assessment by this Evaluation’s Performance Indicators 
Performance  
Indicators 
Ranking 1-3 
1 = performed poorly 
2 = performed less well 
3 = performed well 
Results Achievement 
1. Adoption and use of the MCA decision making tool 1.5 
2. Acceptance of MAPU decisions by clearance operators 2 
3. MAPU coverage of affected communes and districts 2.5 
Sustainability and Capacity Building 
4. Technical capacity and skills acquisition 3 
5. Support for Good Governance 2 
Collaboration and Coordination 
6. With AusAID-supported AVI 1 
7. With Cambodian Mine Action Authority 1 
8. With Provincial Mine Action Committees 3 
Sum of Rankings  15 
(Out of a possible 24) 
Percent of maximum score 62.5% 
 
6.2. The sum of all rankings for the eight indicators is 62.5 per cent of a perfect score, 
less than what one might have hoped. Three areas of performance, in particular, are 
responsible.  
 
6.2.1. The use of a directive, rather than a consultative approach for introducing the 
MCA priority setting tool resulted in a number of intended users rejecting or losing 
interest in making it a part of their standard procedures. 
 
6.2.1.1. Finding a useful and user-friendly way to put this kind of analytical tool into 
practice relies on dialogue and experimentation, and while there were discussions and 
training and a testing period,26 the TAP project did not succeed in achieving the broad 
                                                 
25
 There are other indicators that might have been used. The TAP project’s own assessment included, 
among its chosen indicators, whether the MAPU members’ confidence was enhanced by the uniforms 
provided. Readers may consult this scheme for comparison in Annex IV.  
26
 A formal review of the adaptation of the MCA priority setting tool was held in August 2005, deficiencies 
were identified and revisions were made. This was described in: GeoSpatial International Inc., “Task 
Assessment and Planning in Cambodia,” Progress Report for the quarter ended 30 September 2005 
 28
acceptance one might have wished. Greater consultation with the DWGs, the MAPUs, 
the PMACs and the AVI would have been desirable.   
  
6.2.2. The omission of any formal initiative to build bridges between the MAPU 
groups and the clearance operators as well as other NGOs meant that opportunities 
were missed for giving the MAPUs a greater role in managing and maintaining 
information and consequently greater authority in coordinating minefield clearance.  
 
6.2.2.1. The creation of formal linkages, collaborative training and collaborative data 
gathering programs with operators and prominent NGOs would have placed collaboration 
with them on more solid ground. Even if this was not part of the original project design, it 
should have been and at a minimum should have emerged as an obvious necessity in the 
course of the project. One of the most valuable functions that the project might have 
served is to have established which organization would collect what type of information 
and how the MAPUs could serve to integrate them. At present the operators collect their 
own data using their own diverse sources, the International Labour Organization collects 
information through its Integrated Rural Assessment Planning (IRAP) and the 
Cambodian Red Cross along with Handicap International Belgium maintain the 
Cambodia Mine Victim Information System (CMVIS). At some point, these sources of 
integration will have to be amalgamated and unless the MAPUs assume responsibility, 
the present fragmentation in functions will allow the clearance operators to continue 
working on their own with little regard for the MAPU priorities.  
 
6.2.3. A collaborative relationship never emerged between the TAP project and the 
AVI project though they were implemented concurrently. The TAP project would 
have benefited by doing more to find ways for the two projects to make the most of 
their comparative advantages. 
 
6.2.3.1. The obligation to maintain a collaborative relationship with the AVI advisors 
rested largely with the TAP project. This was due to the circumstances: the AVI project 
design emerged out of extensive consultation and considerable experience in the area. 
There was also the reality that four AVI advisors worked on a daily basis with the MAPU 
groups while the TAP project had only an intermittent presence.  This gave the AVI 
advisors a familiarity with the MAPUs that the TAP project never had and left the TAP 
project really no choice but to work closely with the AVI advisors.   
 
6.3. The TAP project has had some successes. Its training programs have been 
appreciated. MAPU members cite particularly the training by the TAP project field 
manager, who has extensive minefield experience, on how to survey a minefield and 
how, in particular to take safety precautions. This has made the MAPU members more 
inclined to conduct minefield investigations in person and to visit villages for confirming 
claims made by the village chiefs in the initial investigations held at district offices. 
MAPU members are now visiting villages and minefields more than before. Inquiry 
protocols, information technology and GPS devices have been provided, giving their 
observations greater precision. Particularly commendable have been efforts of the TAP 
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project to bring PMAC members on board by providing training to them, whether it be in 
minefield investigation or the use of the MCA priority setting tool.   
 
6.4. But the shortcomings, especially regarding the way the project has been designed and 
implemented, are at least as prominent as the successes. An assessment of the TAP 
Project offers a valuable opportunity to draw lessons from this project’s experience for 
improving performance in subsequent endeavors. The most pertinent of these lessons are 
reviewed in the next section.  
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7. Lessons Learned 
 
7.1. Project Preparation. Insufficient care was taken in preparing the TAP project. 
Some sources spoke of the TAP project as “dropping from the clouds.” Its design would 
have benefited from a broader consultation with stakeholders and, as well, from more on-
the-ground examination of the principal objectives and constraints. At the very least, a 
more careful design would have helped the project avoid overlap with other support 
programs and attack specific problems – integration of information sources, for example 
–neglected by the project.  
 
7.2. Partnership with AVI. The daily presence of the AVI project advisors placed 
considerable importance on building a positive working relationship with them. The TAP 
project originally seemed willing to regard the AVI project advisors as allies and 
attempted to cement this alliance by striking a Joint Steering Committee for the two 
projects. But differences arose. It was in the TAP project’s interest to recognize that 
whatever the theoretical or practical differences in approach, AVI’s on site presence gave 
them a unique advantage. The TAP project could have regarded their presence as an 
asset, but in many instances, it did not. A more consultative approach on the part of the 
TAP project would have served the overall project objectives far better.  
 
7.3. Introduction of the MCA priority setting tool. Some development practitioners 
might complain that such phrases as “participatory development” and “responsive 
programming” have been used too much and without sufficient rigour over the past two 
decades. But this should not obscure the truth of them: that end users have to make 
innovations their own before they adopt them fully. The TAP project’s MCA priority 
setting tool was delivered largely ready made even though it was patently too complex 
for many of the intended users. Criticisms of the tool were reportedly not easily accepted 
by the TAP project management. This was a clear example of a technology in search of 
an appropriate application, and the lesson is, once again, that broad consultation and 
responsive approaches are not just advisable steps in the process but are essential to 
ensuring that end users will take an interest in the innovation.  
 
7.4. Connecting outputs and outcomes. Project planning must demonstrate a connection 
between immediate outputs and the broader outcomes/objectives. The ultimate objective 
of any support to the MAPU Process, the TAP project notably, is to contribute to making 
the influence and authority of the MAPUs match that of the clearance operators. This is 
the only way more donors are likely to come on board and support decentralized 
government planning units as viable mechanisms for directing mine action efforts. This 
was implicit in the project design but not sufficiently explicit to make working formally 
with clearance operators and other influential NGOs a prominent feature of the project. 
Programming should have included a strategy for positioning the MAPUs as an 
information hub, among other things, connecting in this way the project’s outputs with 
what are Canada’s real objectives in Cambodia’s mine action sector.  
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7.5. Constructive engagement with stakeholders. Constructive engagement with 
diverse stakeholders is a key component of building institutional capacity in groups such 
as those that figure in the MAPU Process. Engaging with government bodies (PMACs 
and CMAA), with other projects that have similar objectives, with other donors, NGOs 
and key actors in the mine action sector is essential. This is particularly important where 
opinions on approach diverge as they do in Cambodia. It would have been to the TAP 
project’s advantage to devote more attention to building bridges and deliberate linkages 
among the key stakeholders associated with the MAPU process.  
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8. Recommendations 
 
8.1. Exit Strategy. The termination of the TAP project will have different impacts in 
different provinces depending on the level of support each of the five MAPUs can be 
expected to receive in the near future. It is recommended that exit strategies be prepared 
for each of the five different provinces that takes realistically into account an appraisal of 
what sources of support may be forthcoming and what tasks MAPUs can be expected to 
perform. The role of the Agricultural Development in Mine Affected Areas of Cambodia 
(ADMAC) project will figure significantly in these exit strategies.    
 
8.2. Amalgamation of Information. One of the prerequisites for the MAPUs to 
effectively influence provincial level decisions on mine action is to be able to access all 
information available on victims, victim assistance, suspected areas, changes in land use 
and relevant community initiatives. MAPUs should ideally serve as repositories of this 
information. It is recommended that the TAP project, in collaboration with Australian 
Volunteers International (AVI), develop a step-wise plan for bringing together in a single 
database or in linked databases within the MAPU offices all relevant and available 
information pertinent to mine action in the five provinces. This would include 
information maintained by the three operators. It would also include information 
collected under ILO’s Integrated Rural Assessment Planning (IRAP) as well as the 
information maintained as part of the Cambodia Mine Victim Information System. 
Information collected under the Community Based Mine Risk Reduction (CBMRR) 
program supported through CMAC by UNICEF and Handicap International Belgium 
should have a place in the MAPU offices. The plan should specify the technical resources 
required initially as well as the personnel and technical resources needed to maintain this 
coordinated data management over an extended period.  
 
8.3. Review of Photo Map Usage. The original expectation was that Quickbird satellite 
imagery would be provided for investigators to use in their interactions with district and 
village leaders for specifying mine field locations. When digital aerial photographs dating 
from 2001 became available at less cost, a project decision was made to use these aerial 
photographs instead; they were not of the highest quality and the TAP project decided to 
do what was possible to improve them. It is recommended that the TAP project conduct 
an assessment to determine how useful these aerial photographs have been in 
investigating mine field locations and what has been the consequence of the project 
decision to not use up-to-date satellite imagery. This is important not just for this project 
but also for the MAPU groups to know whether maps of this type are worth the cost, 
what are the gaps in the coverage and how valuable they are in specifying minefield 
locations. Ultimately it is important to know the value of these maps in expediting the 
decision-making process for minefield clearance.  
 
8.4. Technical Operation Guidebook and National Guidelines. A draft MAPU 
Technical Operation Guidebook was prepared in collaboration between the MAPU staff 
and GeoSpatial International’s project personnel and circulated in December 2005. The 
Guidebook outlines MAPU procedures including the development of mine action plans at 
village, district and provincial levels, decision-making and monitoring of clearance 
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activities. It is recommended that further work be done by the TAP project on this 
valuable initiative. Consultations should be held with the Cambodia Mine Action 
Authority on the Guidebook with the objective of making the Guidebook consistent in 
structure and format with national guidelines drafted under the authority of the CMAA.   
 
8.5. Cambodia Mine Action Authority and the TAP project. Repairing the strained 
relations between the Cambodia Mine Action Authority (CMAA) and the TAP project 
may have little impact on the project itself, but it will make a difference in future 
collaborations between Canada and Cambodia on mine action programs. It is 
recommended that some resolution of the differences between the TAP project and 
CMAA be achieved. Since direct interaction between GeoSpatial International Inc. and 
CMAA may not be productive, it is recommended that GeoSpatial approach a third party 
such as the NGO Mine Action Forum to facilitate the process and assist in the 
reconciliation.  
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Annex I: Informants and Interviewees 
 
Royal Government of Cambodia 
HE Sam Sotha  Advisor to the Prime Minister and Secretary General of  
  Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority  
Noum Chay Roum Chief, MAPU, Battambang Province 
In Vira  Deputy Chief, MAPU, Battambang 
Members of PMAC  Battambang Province 
Members of MAPU Battambang Province 
Huot Sattha  Chief, MAPU, Pailin Province 
Tith Thy  Deputy, MAPU, Pailin Province 
Members of PMAC  Pailin Province 
Members of MAPU Pailin Province 
Leng Ranin   Deputy Chief, MAPU, Beantey Meancheay Province 
Chuon Bunnuon Chief, MAPU, Preah Vihear Province 
Khiew Niep  Deputy Chief, MAPU, Preah Vihear Province 
Members of MAPU Preah Vihear Province 
Commune Chief Chien Mok Commune, Tobai Meancheay District Preah  
  Vihear 
Khut Suerk  Chief, MAPU Otdor Meancheay Province 
Khim Bo  Deputy Chief, MAPU, Otdor Meancheay Province 
Lum Hak  Deputy Chief, PMAC, Otdor Meancheay Province 
Caroline Rusten  Program Advisor, SEILA Program, Partnership for Local  
    Government 
Ian Thomas  Technical Assistance and Database Manager, Cambodian  
  Mine Action Authority 
 
Mine Clearance Operators 
Chea Sarim   Regional Manager, MAG, Battabang Province 
Oum Socheath    Deputy Manager, CMAC, Banteay Meancheay Province 
Tep Arun  Acting Manager, HALO Trust, Kamrieng, Battambang  
  Province 
Gary Fenton  Technical Operations Manager, MAG, Phnom Penh 
H.E. Heng Rathna National Deputy Director, CMAC 
Richard Boulter National Program Manager, HALO Trust, Siem Reap 
Pring Panharith  Manager, CMAC, Preah Vihear Province 
Norm Sinnath  Manager, MAG, Preah Vihear 
 
NGOs   
Bob Eaton   Director, Survey Action Centre 
David W. McCracken National EOD Evaluation Project, Norwegian People’s  
  Aid, Phnom Penh 
Scott Rankin   National Program Manager, Australian Volunteers   
  International 
Peter Britton  Senior Program ManagerAustralian Volunteers   
  International 
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Rebecca Day  Australian Volunteers International Technical Advisor  
  Battambang and Pailin Provinces 
Andy Kervell   Australian Volunteers International Technical Advisor,  
  MAPU Beantey Meancheay Province 
Stuart Pidgeon  Australian Volunteers International Technical Advisor  
  Preah Vihear Province 
Jade Fraser  Australian Volunteers International Technical Advisor 
  Otdor Meancheay Province 
Prom Soeun  Australian Volunteers International, Translator and Data  
  Specialist, Preah Vihear 
Sharon Wilkinson Country Director, CARE  
Brian Agland   Assistant Country Director for Programs, Care 
Marc Bonnet  Regional Resident Representative, Norwegian People’s Aid 
Prum Suon Praseth Program Development Officer Humanitarian Mine   
 Action, Norwegian People’s Aid 
 
Task Assessment and Planning Project  
Mao Vanna  General Manager, GeoSpatial International and Field   
  Manager, TAP Project   
Andrew Boan  Database Specialist engaged by GeoSpatial International 
for TAP Project 
 
Multilateral and Bilateral Donors 
Michael Rymek Head of Aid, CIDA 
Julien Chevillard Mine Action Specialists, UNDP 
Ricarda Rieger  Deputy Resident Representative, Operations  
Nigel Coulson  Governance Department, DfID 
Dr. Jose E. Echevarria Head of Office, EU Directorate General for Humanitarian  
  Aid (ECHO) 
Claes Leijon  Sida Resident Representative, Embassy of Sweden 
Nguon Sokunthea Program Officer, AusAID, Australian Embassy 
Stephen Close  Senior Program Officer, AusAID, Australian Embassy 
Tim Conway   Poverty Specialist, World Bank 
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Annex II: The MAPU Process 
 
II.1. A complex of provincial government bodies has emerged in recent years to select the 
minefields that merit the most urgent attention. These bodies have evolved with each 
passing year as refinements are made to what they are expected to do, to their resources 
and to their ever-increasing capacity. Though the core of this decision-making 
mechanism in the provinces is the Mine Action Planning Unit (MAPU), the MAPU is 
only one of three provincial bodies which interact in supporting mine action planning and 
which the TAP project, and other projects preceding it, have aimed to strengthen. The 
mechanism is widely referred to as the MAPU Process.   
 
II. 2. Local planning bodies were introduced eight years ago once landmine clearance 
began in earnest to regulate how and by whom the land would be used once it was secure. 
One of their functions was to check the tendency for operators to work for wealthy 
landowners who used their influence to claim newly cleared land. With support from 
Handicap International France, Handicap International Belgium and the NGO, Action 
Nord-Sud, the provincial governments in Battambang and Banteay Meancheay, two of 
the most contaminated provinces, came up with a mechanism for investigating and 
approving mine clearance tasks to ensure the right areas were cleared and the right people 
got the benefit. At the district level, there were the District Working Groups (DWGs) 
which would provide information to Land Use Planning Units (LUPUs) at the provincial 
level which would compile information and submit it for approval to a supervisory, 
interdepartmental body, the Planning Sub-Committees (PSCs). This three-tiered 
mechanism was the scaffolding on which a more elaborate structure would subsequently 
evolve.  
 
II.3. Handicap International Belgium (HIB) worked with the Cambodian Mine Action 
Centre (CMAC), the national mine clearance agency, to establish this three-tiered system 
in a number of provinces. Three of them especially received dedicated support: Otdor 
Meancheay, Banteay Meancheay and Preah Vihear. A fourth in Battambang received 
support from AusAID. All four of them emerged at more or less the same time, in more 
or less the same direction and with more or less the same resources. By late 2003 some 
trends were clear. The interdepartmental oversight committee, the Provincial Sub-
Committee (PSC) was not very active and left most of the decisions to the chairman who, 
in turn, relied on the investigations of the Land Use Planning Units (LUPUs). The 
District Working Groups (DWGs) did not always make the required information 
available to the Land Use Planning Unit members (LUPUs). The LUPUs were left to fill 
a large void; they made decisions for the PSC, they collected information, and because 
the need was so considerable, they were also making decisions about where to work and 
why. In addition, they were expected to fulfill their original mandate, to keep disputes 
from erupting over claims to cleared land.  
 
II.4. The LUPUs had too much work to do, some of it ill-defined, not enough ability to do 
it and because they were inexperienced and not particularly well-paid, they received little 
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respect from the clearance operators, especially MAG and HALO Trust.27 This was a 
significant liability. With a minimum of experience and skill, they actually depended on 
the clearance operators and the development NGOs for identifying their minefields, and 
this defeated the purpose. The idea was for the three-tiered system to coordinate the 
operators, not the reverse, to establish a provincial body with the ability to make 
independent and authoritative mine clearance decisions based on the interests of the 
affected villagers, not the interests of the operators and their funders.  
 
II.5. The system had its growing pains. But the idea was a good one and support was 
available. Care International, World Vision and Australian Volunteers International all 
provided assistance to the Land Use Planning Unit (LUPU) in Battambang, and 
UNDP/CARERE and Norwegian People’s Aid supported the Land Use Planning Unit 
(LUMU) in Banteay Meancheay.  
 
II.6. Meanwhile the mine action sector was changing. Decentralization, supported by a 
consortium of donors through the Seila project, added its weight and financial support to 
shifting authority over mine action policy from the national to the provincial level, giving 
support to these decentralized LUPU bodies and reducing their dependence on the 
national coordinating body. The timing was good since impatience was growing with the 
national level body, the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA) in Phnom Penh. At 
the same time, UNDP was assisting the government to make the three-tiered provincial 
planning mechanism the subject of an official government document, and by October 
2004, a Sub-Decree on Socio-Economic Management of Mine Clearance Operations was 
approved by the Council of Ministers. Instead of operating under the authority of donors 
and NGOs, the provincial mine action planning structure now operated under the 
authority of the Royal Government of Cambodia. The names of the bodies were changed 
in the sub-decree and their functions adjusted. The Provincial Sub-Committee (PSC) 
became the Provincial Mine Action Committee (PMAC), chaired by the provincial 
governor, or his appointee, and the Land Use Planning Unit (LUPU) became the Mine 
Action Planning Unit (MAPU). The new title reflected the broad spectrum of functions 
the MAPU had came to assume in the four provinces. 
 
II.7. A high profile evaluation of mine action in Cambodia, commissioned jointly by the 
Donor Working Group on Mine Action28, appeared shortly after the approval of the Sub-
Decree, and pushed even further the lessons arising out of the LUPU experiments in the 
provinces and the themes implicit in the Sub-Decree. It came to some landmark 
conclusions.  It claimed that the scope of the demining task in Cambodia had been 
overestimated, that the landmine problem was solvable within 10-15 years.  What was 
needed was a more efficient and cost conscious approach to managing mine clearance 
activities. Operators had to be more cost effective and, to this end, mine clearance tasks 
should be assigned to operators through a competitive bidding process. At the same time, 
the tasks should be chosen more carefully to ensure that the most essential areas for the 
                                                 
27: Michael Bolton, Praivan Limpanboon, Chhim Vanak, LUPU Project Evaluation: Report of an External 
Evaluation of the Handicap International Belgium Project: Support for the Planning of Demining and the 
Utilization of Demined Land in Cambodia, Handicap International Belgium, October 2003 
28
 Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, UNICEF and UNDP 
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national economy and for poverty reduction be cleared first. This would be the job of the 
provincial planning bodies, the MAPU Process.29 
 
II.8. Expectations of the MAPU Process were rising. At this critical juncture, just as the 
Sub-Decree was approved and the conclusions of the joint evaluation were under 
discussion, two new projects appeared to support the MAPU Process. One of these, the 
AVI project was a continuation of four years of experience in Battambang Province. This 
was the AVI Capacity Building for Mine Action project that would provide technical 
advisors for all five30 of the new Mine Action Planning Units (MAPUs).  The other, the 
Canada-funded TAP project appeared on the scene with the intention of providing some 
technical training, putting a database in place, providing maps for the MAPU 
investigators to use in investigations with villagers and, more specifically, of introducing 
a model for MAPU members to use in deciding on appropriate clearance priorities. 
 
II.9. Both project’s interventions would have to be mindful of participating in an evolving 
mechanism, one with an eight year history of attempts to invest mine action decisions in a 
provincial government authority. There were lessons to be learned from the past. The 
projects would have to build on the initial efforts by the LUPUs to regulate the 
distribution of cleared land, on the attempts to monitor the clearance activities of the 
operators, and on the more recent efforts to make the newly sanctioned MAPUs credible 
coordinators of mine clearance operations.     
                                                 
29
 Robert Griffin and Robert Keeley, Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia, Donor Working Group 
on Mine Action, December 2004.  
30
 A fifth province – Pailin - had been added to the original four where Land Use Planning Units (LUPUs) 
had originally been tried.  
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Annex IV: Relevance of Evaluation Indicators to 
Anticipated Project Outputs and Outcome 
 
Evaluation’s Performance Indicators Project’s Performance Indicators 
Results Achievement 
1. Adoption and use of the MCA decision 
making tool 
MAPU staff and manage priority setting 
process 
MAPU stakeholders are able to participate 
in MCA in a transparent manner 
MAPU, District and Commune Staff are 
able to operate and manage MCA without 
external technical advisors 
2. Acceptance of MAPU decisions by 
clearance operators  
MAPU stakeholders are able to participate 
in MCA in a transparent manner 
3. MAPU coverage of affected communes 
and districts  
Stakeholders actively participate in 
establishing decision support tool criteria 
MAPU, District and Commune Staff are 
able to operate and manage MCA without 
external technical advisors 
Sustainability and Capacity Building 
4. Technical capacity and skills acquisition MAPU, District and Commune Staff are 
able to operate and manage MCA without 
external technical advisors 
5. Support for good governance MAPU stakeholders are able to participate 
in MCA in a transparent manner 
Collaboration and Coordination 
6. With Aus-AID-Supported AVI Stakeholders actively participate in 
establishing decision support tool criteria 
7. With Cambodian Mine Action Authority CMAA database is able to provide up to 
date information to local staff 
Stakeholders actively participate in 
establishing decision support tool criteria 
8. With Provincial Mine Action Committees Stakeholders actively participate in 
establishing decision support tool criteria 
Source: (1) Geospatial International, “Proposed Logical Framework Analysis and Performance Monitoring 
Plan,” Task Assessment and Planning Project – The Introduction of MCA Decision Support at LUPUs in 
Cambodia, Project Design Document, September 2003; (2) Geospatial International, “Project Performance 
Planning Framework,” Contribution Agreement, July 2004 
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Annex V: Terms of Reference 
Institutional Capacity Assessment of Mine Action Programming in 
Cambodia 
 
Background: 
 
Cambodia is one of the countries most affected by mines and explosive remnants of war 
(ERW), due to almost three decades of conflict.  Some 900 new landmine and UXO 
(unexploded ordinance) casualties were reported in 2004, with an additional 594 
casualties being reported to the end of June 2005.  These represent significant increases 
with respect to 2003, and point to an increase in casualties from UXO.  The Landmine 
Impact Survey (LIS) issued in May 2002 identified 4,466 square kilometres suspected to 
be affected by mines and other ERW.  It is estimated that 5.18 million people in 6,422 
villages were at risk, and that about 1,640 villages (12% of all villages in Cambodia) had 
a high contamination of landmines and UXO.   
Most mine/ERW incidents are associated with livelihood activities being undertaken in 
forests and fields, and therefore have a negative socio-economic impact in affected 
communities.  A cost-benefit analysis of Cambodian mine clearance programs, conducted 
in 2004-05 for the CMAA (Cambodia Mine Action Victim Assistance Authority) and 
UNDP, indicated that benefits for 2004 were about US$37 million, distributed 80 percent 
on clearance for development and 20% on reduced human losses.  In general, net benefits 
are estimated to be 38% higher than costs, suggesting a significant return on investment 
in mine action. 
 
The Kingdom of Cambodia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, and the 
Treaty entered into force on 1 January 2000.     
 
Canada’s support for Mine Action in Cambodia in 2004 amounted to over C$1.1M.  This 
was broken down as follows: 
• $374,437 to Geospatial International for capacity building at the community level. 
• $359,134 to World Vision Canada for integrated mine action (victim assistance). 
• $249,372 to Oxfam Québec for landmine survivor vocational training. 
• $110,000 to Mines Action Group for two EOD teams. 
• $15,086 for survivor handicraft enterprises (funded by Foreign Affairs) 
 
The Cambodia bilateral program has also commenced an agricultural development 
project which has a significant mine action ($1.1M over four years) component.  The 
project is being implemented by Geospatial International, and began operations in 
September 2005. 
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Issue: 
 
The CMAA took over the coordination and regulation of mine action at the national level 
in September 2002.  Its responsibilities include integration of mine action into 
government development plans (including the National Poverty Reduction Strategy and 
Millennium Development Goals).  In order to prioritize mine action at the local level, and 
integrating it with development objectives, Mine Action Planning Units (MAPUs) were 
established (generally broadening the mandate of existing Land Use Planning 
Units/LUPUs) under the auspices of the CMAA, and working in conjunction with 
Provincial Mine Action Centres (PMACs).  MAPUs are thus expected to be the focal 
points for coordination between affected communities and demining and development 
agencies. 
 
However, an evaluation carried out in 2004 for the Cambodia Donor Working Group on 
Mine Action found that donors as well as operators lacked confidence in CMAA, due to 
its weakness and ineffectiveness.  It recommended that the CMAA should focus its 
efforts on policy development, preparation of annual reports and resource mobilization.  
As an alternative approach towards coordinating mine action operations, the UNDP has 
established a trust fund through which donors may channel support for mine action in 
Cambodia, yet still maintaining linkages with the CMAA for coordination with the host 
government. 
 
Capacity-building for mine action planning in Cambodia is largely provided by two 
organizations:  Australian Volunteers International (AVI), funded by AusAid and 
GeoSpatial International (GSI), funded by CIDA.  More specifically, GSI is engaged in 
the identification of processes to improve data collection by MAPU staff, while both AVI 
and GSI have been involved in developing PMAC capacity in information management 
and data collection. 
 
Objectives: 
 
1. To monitor and review the progress on the GeoSpatial Incorporated (GSI) Task 
Assessment Project (TAP).   
i. Monitoring progress against expected results, as presented in the 
project LFA and PMF. 
ii. Assessing the successes achieved and challenges remaining 
through the capacity-building efforts of the TAP. 
iii. Assessing the effectiveness of integration efforts between the TAP 
and other relevant mine action programming in similar areas. 
iv. Provide recommendations for an appropriate exit strategy and 
transfer of operations upon closure of the project in June 2006. 
 
2. To undertake a due diligence assessment of the UNDP Cambodia office.  Assess: 
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a. The consistency between CIDA's policy and programming priorities and 
the organization's capacity for implementation; 
b. The degree of leverage obtained with CIDA's investment; 
c. The comparative advantage of using the organization to meet CIDA's 
program and/or sectoral interests; 
d. The degree of effectiveness and transparency of the organization's 
governance system; 
e. The organization's capacity to demonstrate sound management practices; 
f. The results of previous evaluations;  
g. The determination that a results-based accountability framework is in 
place for CIDA to determine the effectiveness of its grant payment, 
including performance indicators, expected results and outcomes, methods 
for reporting on performance and evaluation criteria.  
 
A full description of the requirements for a due diligence assessment of a 
proposed grant recipient is attached as an annex. 
 
Deliverables: 
 
1. Structured workplan and schedule, with list of key contacts and activities. 
2. A monitoring report on the progress of the GeoSpatial TAP project. 
3. A due diligence report on the UNDP Cambodia office. 
 
Both reports shall be submitted in electronic format using word processing software 
acceptable to CIDA (i.e., Microsoft Word, Lotus WordPro or Corel WordPerfect). 
 
Reporting: 
 
The consultant will report to the Program Officer responsible for Asia within the Mine 
Action Unit of CIDA.   
 
While in the field, the consultant will report to the Head of Aid, Phnom Penh. 
 
Estimated Level of Effort: 
 
Preparatory review of documents 
& preparation of workplan:  3 days 
Mission in Cambodia: up to 14 days (including debrief to Head of Aid, 
Phnom Penh) 
Transit time for travel:  4 days (2 days each way) 
Preparation of draft report:  4 days 
Finalization of report:   1 days 
 
Travel to Ottawa for debriefing: 2.5 days 
 
Total Level of Effort:  28.5 days
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Annex VI: Results of TAP Project Self Assessment Showing Overall Present Confidence (Column 
1) and Change in Confidence Over Previous Year (Column 2) 
by Topic Scored on a Scale of 1-10 (1=lowest) 
Topic 1 
Overall Confidence, Score Now  
(Average for Group) 
2 
Change in Confidence over the Last Year 
(Average for Group) 
 Chief Members  CMAP-C Chief Members  CMAP-C 
Appropriateness of Uniforms 9.2 9.4 9.8 8.0 7.0 5.8 
Usefulness of Equipment 8.6 8.1 8.6 5.2 5.2 4.8 
Safe Conduct in Suspected Mined Areas 8.8 7.3 7.8 5.6 3.9 5.4 
Minefield Investigation 8.4 7.6 7.8 4.8 3.7 4.2 
Confidence in conducting Commune 
meetings 
8.2 7.2 8.2 3.0 2.3 4.8 
Confidence in conducting District 
meetings 
7.8 6.5 8.2 2.0 2.2 3.8 
Confidence in reviewing reports from 
mine action operators 
8.2 7.3 7.7 3.6 3.4 3.7 
Confidence in ability to communicate 
successfully with PMAC 
7.0 8.1 7.8 2.0 2.7 3.0 
Knowledge of interview techniques 7.8 6.3 7.8 4.2 3.0 4.2 
Use of the Database 6.8 6.8 8.2 3.8 3.8 5.6 
Knowledge and use of MCA 7.4 7.3 7.2 3.6 3.8 5.0 
Capability to transfer knowledge to 
colleagues 
6.8 6.7 7.8 2.8 2.4 3.6 
Capability to prioritise tasks 7.2 6.8 7.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Use of field support tools (air photo, 
maps, compass, GPS, data forms 
7.4 6.0 7.2 4.8 3.7 4.4 
Confidence in ability to work without 
support from GSI/AVI 
6.4 6.1 6.8 4.2 2.7 3.6 
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